Overview

HOLDINGS: [1]-Where plaintiffs sought to certify three classes pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, contending that all purported class members, who worked as Technical Solutions Consultants (TSCs) I-III, were misclassified as exempt, plaintiffs failed to satisfy Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement for the Massachusetts class because the evidence was sufficient to suggest that the class representative could become preoccupied with defenses unique to him, there derailing the claims of the class; [2]-Although the other two classes satisfied all of the requirements set forth in Rule 23(a), common questions did not predominate because the determination of whether or not a TSC I-III was exempt would require individual inquiries; [3]-Plaintiffs also failed to carry their burden under the superiority prong of Rule 23(b)(3). Parties’ Los Angeles litigation attorney appeal.

Outcome

Motion to certify class denied.

Procedural Posture

Plaintiff, in an arbitral forum, subpoenaed certain documents from defendant surgery center, a nonparty to an arbitration agreement. The arbitrator ordered the surgery center to produce the documents for his in camera review. The San Diego County Superior Court, California, denied the surgery center’s motion for a protective order, ruling that it did not have jurisdiction to review the arbitrator’s discovery order. The surgery center appealed.

Overview

The surgery center argued that the arbitrator was not authorized to enforce a discovery subpoena against it, and that the trial court was required to exercise jurisdiction over its motion for a protective order. The instant court’s lead opinion concluded that the limited review provisions of Code Civ. Proc., § 1283.05, subd. (c), did not bind persons or entities, like the surgery center, who were not parties to the arbitration agreement and not otherwise aligned with the parties. The severe limitation on judicial review of arbitral decisions could only be imposed on those who had voluntarily agreed to have their disputes arbitrated or who had some relationship with one of the parties to the arbitration agreement. The trial court had jurisdiction in both the fundamental sense and in the broader sense to hear the surgery center’s motion for a protective order. Thus, because the arbitrator had made a discovery determination under § 1283.05, the surgery center’s request for relief from the arbitrator’s discovery order was subject to plenary judicial review.

Outcome

The trial court’s order was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.